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ARGUMENT
I.
THE NOTE IS NOT AN
INTEGRATED AGREEMENT
A.

The Novell

Case is Not Applicable to the Facts of the

Present Case.
Plaintiff relies on Novell,
Inc.,

92 P.3d 768 (Utah App.

Inc.

v.

The Canopy

Group,

2004), for the proposition

that the Note was integrated and therefore parole evidence
was inadmissible.

(Brief of Appellee, 18-25).

reliance is misplaced.

Plaintiff's

The facts distinguish Novell

from

the present case.
The defendant in Novell

asserted that the written

agreement was subject to a contemporaneous oral agreement
modifying its terms.

92 P.3d at 771.

The Utah Court of

Appeals held, however, that no such agreement was made.
at 774.

Id.

Instead, the evidence showed that during the

negotiations over royalties, there had been draft

agreements

containing a formulation favorable to Canopy in deducting
litigation fees and costs from royalties.

Id.

However, by

mutual agreement of the parties, the term favorable to
Canopy was removed from the final agreement.

-1-

Id.

The removal of the litigation expense deduction by
mutual agreement of the parties is conclusive.

Because the

parties came to a final and complete agreement not to deduct
litigation expenses from royalties, the written agreement
had become partially integrated as to that question and
parol evidence of a different deal was properly excluded.
The present case would be like Novell

if Cantamar's

agent, Thuett, and DSI's representatives had initially
discussed whether the "Due Date" in the Note should be
subject to a condition for obtaining a $15 million loan, had
included that condition in a prior draft of the Note, and
then in a final negotiating session had fully explored the
issue and after considering it at length had agreed to
remove it, leaving only the "Due Date."
But that did not happen.

The Note was a form

generated by Thuett off his computer with no prior
discussion of its terms.

(Champagne Aff., 126, R.

66).

Like its predecessors, the Note contained a "Due Date."
(Id.,

Exh.

6; R.

92). But, as with its predecessors,

there was no expectation that the due date would be enforced
unless the $15 million loan were first procured from which

-2-

(Id.,

to repay the Note.

524; R.

65).

Far from agreeing

to remove the condition for a $15 million loan, the parties
reaffirmed it at the final meeting, then signed the Note.
(Id.,

526; R.

66).

The facts of this case require a different outcome than
in Novell.

They require the outcome reached by the Utah

Supreme Court in Union Bank v.
1985).

Swenson,

707 P.2d 663 (Utah

(See discussion of Union Bank in the Brief of

Appellants, 34-35).
In Union Bank,

as in the present case, the trial court

applied the parol evidence rule, refused to consider an oral
agreement for a condition precedent, and granted summary
judgment.

707 P.2d at 664-665.

The Utah Supreme Court

reversed, holding that the evidence of a condition precedent
was admissible and was sufficient to rebut the presumption
of integration.
B.

Id.,

at 666.

DSI's Evidence Rebuts the Presumption of Integration.
Cantamar argues that DSI has failed to present

sufficient evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption
of integration under the standard established in

Novell.

(Brief of Appellee, 23). Cantamar's argument, however,

-3-

disregards the fact that Novell

did not discuss or establish

a standard for overcoming the presumption.
need to, because in Novell
challenge the presumption.

There was no

there was no oral agreement to
Novell,

supra,

92 P.3d at 774.

The standard was, however, elucidated in Union

Bank.

There, the Utah Supreme Court held that evidence sufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
integration was sufficient to rebut the presumption for
purposes of summary judgment.

Union Bank,

supra,

707 P.2d

665-666.
C.

Cantamar is Bound by Thuett's Course of Dealing.
Course of dealing may be considered in deciding whether

an agreement is integrated.
Hospital,

Ele

v.

St.

Benedict's

638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981).

Cantamar does not take issue with the legal principle
in Ele.

Rather, Cantamar argues that "course of dealing"

does not matter in the present case because the course of
dealing on the prior notes was between DSI and "another
party."

(Brief of Appellee, 31). The "other party", of

course, was Cantamar's agent, Troy Thuett.

-4-

Cantamar cannot so easily disown Mr.

Thuett.

Glenn

Britt, the manager of Cantamar, admitted in his deposition
that Troy Thuett's actions in meeting with DSI, preparing
the Note, and obtaining DSI's signatures, were all done at
the request of Cantamar.
Mr.

Britt Deposition, 47; R. 273.

Britt also admitted that Thuett acted as

Cantamar's agent in his course of dealing with DSI prior to
the Note.

At the second hearing on summary judgment in the

court below, the following summary of Britt's testimony was
provided by Cantamar's attorney:
Mr. Britt's testimony in his deposition was that
he, though the prior notes were funded by - or in
the name of Mr. [Thuett's] company that Cantamar
provided the funding for all of those notes
through this broker. Cantamar is the one who
provided the money for the notes either prior or
at the time of this note.
Tr., at 61 (emphasis added).
Cantamar's admission was understood by the court below
to mean that Thuett was Cantamar's agent.

Judge Hansen

stated his understanding as follows:
[T]he defendants in this case claim that no money
is due and owing and with respect to Paragraph 8,
that was disputed on the theory that [Thuett] was
an agent of the plaintiff and I think that's
acknowledged by both sides that the money was paid
for the prior notes by Cantamar and [Thuett] was

-5-

the agent that arranged for those loans payable to
the defendants.
Tr. , at 63-64 (emphasis added).
For purposes of summary judgment, it must be concluded
that Thuett was acting as Cantamar's agent, not only in
obtaining the Note, but also in connection with the prior
notes.
Cantamar's relationship with Thuett is established not
only by Cantamar's admissions, but by Cantamar's actions in
pursuing collection of the Note.
v.

Stephens,

199 P.

In Central

Bank of

Bingham

1018 (Utah 1921), the Utah Supreme

Court faced a fact situation similar to the one in the
present case: a bank's agent obtained a promissory note
subject to an oral agreement that it would not be enforced.
Id.,

at 1019.

The bank's successor tried to enforce the

note and wanted to disregard the agent's promises, but the
Utah Supreme Court would not allow that:
[The bank] could not in one breath be heard to say
that Kelly is without authority to bind it as his
agent and in the next breath insist that it,
nevertheless, can avail itself of only so much of
the transaction as was beneficial to it and
repudiate all the rest. If it relies upon the
note it must take it precisely as Kelly took it,
namely, with the conditional agreement under which
it was taken. It must either do that or not take
*\jm

it at all. The law is well settled that, in case
a principal seeks to recover upon a contract in
which the agent exceeded his authority, he must
take the contract as a whole. ... An action to
enforce notes taken by an assumed agent ratifies
his act in taking them, and opens the door to a
defense based upon his misrepresentations in
obtaining them, or charges the principal with
knowledge which the agent possessed concerning
their consideration.

Central

Bank,

supra,

199 P.

at 1022 (emphasis added).

By suing to recover on the Note, Cantamar ratified
Thuett's actions and the representations by which he
obtained the Note.

In addition, Cantamar is charged with

the knowledge Thuett had of DSI's reliance on his
representations in signing the Note.

The course of conduct

between Thuett and DSI is an integral part of that knowledge
and reliance and cannot be disavowed by Cantamar.
II.
THE NOTE WAS AMBIGUOUS
A.

Colonial

Leasing

Supports a Determination That the Note

Was Ambiguous.
Cantamar argues that the Colonial

1

Leasing1

case does

Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Brothers
Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
-7-

not support DSI's position in this appeal.
Appellee, 25-27).
in Colonial

(Brief of

Cantamar argues, first, that the holding

Leasing

was based on provisions in the writing

rather than the oral agreement; and second, that in contrast
with the present case the oral agreement in Colonial
was not inconsistent with the lease.
Cantamar's reading of Colonial
The rule in Colonial

Leasing

Leasing

(Id.)

Leasing

is incomplete.

was based on two equally

important, independent grounds: (1) the terms of the lease
suggested that it was really a sale; and (2) the oral
purchase option also suggested that it was really a sale.
731 P.2d at 485, 487.

The language of Colonial

Leasing

suggests that the oral option, by itself, would have been
sufficient grounds for reversal of summary judgment:
"[A]ppellant has alleged an oral option ... and that is
sufficient to create an issue of fact."
Near the end of the Colonial

Leasing

Id.,

at 488.

opinion, the

Supreme Court cited with approval to the case of FMA
Financial

Corp.

v.

Pro-Printers,

590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979),

in which evidence of an oral option was admitted at trial
over objection.

Colonial

Leasingf

-8-

supra,

731 P.2d at 487-

488.

The Court likened Colonial

Leasing

to Pro-Printers

in

that in both cases evidence of an oral purchase option
created an issue of fact as to the meaning of the contract
Id.

and was admissible despite the parol evidence rule.
In its discussion of the Pro-Printers
in Colonial

Leasing

case, the Court

made the following observation:

In any event, the agreement in this case, for an
oral option, if any, is not inconsistent with the
express terms of the agreement.
Id.

(emphasis added).
Cantamar seizes on this statement to distinguish

Colonial
27).

Leasing

from the present case.

(Brief of Appellee,

Cantamar argues that the condition precedent in the

present case is "directly inconsistent" with the Note,
making this case different from Colonial

Leasing.

(Id.)

Cantamar's argument is not consistent with Utah case
law.

As will be shown in Argument III below, oral

agreements which merely condition the effectiveness of
written terms are not inconsistent with those terms.
B.

The Note Is Ambiguous Under the Doctrine of Practical

Construction.
In its opening brief, DSI argued that under the

-9-

doctrine of practical construction, the "Due Date" in the
Note was ambiguous because none of the due dates in prior
notes had been enforced.

(Brief of Appellants, 23-24).

In response, Cantamar argued the Due Date was
significant, as shown by the fact that prior notes were
rolled into new notes with new maturity dates.

(Brief of

Appellee, 17) .
Both parties are drawing inferences from the facts.
The difference is, that on a motion for summary judgment,
only the inferences that favor DSI may be considered:
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment.
Frlsbee
v. K & K Construction
1984) (emphasis added).

Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah

For purposes of summary judgment, Cantamar's inference
must be disregarded and DSI's inference must be accepted if
fairly drawn from the evidence.

The fairness of DSI's

inference was shown in the Brief of Appellants, 23-27.
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III.
THE NOTE WAS MADE SUBJECT
TO A CONDITION PRECEDENT
In its opening brief, DSI relied on FMA
Corporation
1980).

v.

Hansen

Dairy,

Inc.,

Financial

617 P.2d 327 (Utah

In response, Cantamar makes two arguments in an

attempt to weaken FMA.

First, Cantamar argues that FMA only

admits conditions precedent that are not inconsistent with
the written agreement.

(Brief of Appellee, 28). This

argument fails, however, because parol evidence of a
condition precedent to a payment obligation is not
inconsistent with the payment obligation.

This rule has

been repeatedly recognized by the Utah Supreme Court.
example, in Central

Bank,

For

the Court stated:

[I]f a written instrument is delivered upon an
express condition, and is not to be effective
until the condition is fulfilled, the condition
upon which it was delivered ... may be shown by
parol, and the effect of merely doing that is not
to vary the terms of the written instrument.
Central
Bank of Bingham
(Utah 1921).

v.

Stephens,

199 P.

The same rule was followed in Parker
Irr.

Dlst.,

236 P.

1105 (Utah 1925):

-11-

v.

1018, 1021

Weber

County

[W]here a written instrument, regardless of its
nature or conditions, is delivered upon the
express agreement or understanding by the parties
that the instrument shall not become effective
except upon the happening of a certain event or
not until some act or condition shall have been
performed, the instrument does not become
effective until the happening of the event or
performance of the act or condition. Moreover,
the conditional delivery may always be shown by
parol. [cite omitted] Such evidence does not vary
the terms of the contract, but it merely shows
when the same became effective.
Parker,

supra,

Nuttall

v.

Idaho

Sugar

236 P-

Berntson,
Co. v.

at 1107 (emphasis added);

accord,
Utah-

30 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1934);
State

(Utah 1937) ; FhEL, supra,

Tax Commission,

73 P.2d 974, 977

617 P. 2d at 329,

The only Utah case not in accord with the foregoing
authorities is Bushnell

Real

Estate,

Inc.

v.

Nlelson,

672

P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983), cited by Cantamar in the Brief of
Appellee at pages 28 and 29.

The Utah Supreme Court has

recognized that Bushnell is outside the mainstream and that
its ruling represents a "much stricter application of the
parol evidence rule."

SCM Land Company v.

Watklns

&

732 P.2d 105, 108 n. 3 (Utah 1987).
The strictness of the ruling in Bushnell

may be

explained by the fact that there was no evidence of any

-12-

Faber,

discussion, let alone any agreement, between the parties.
672 P.2d at 750.

The evidence merely showed a "subjective

and uncommunicated intent that payment be conditioned."
In contrast to Bushnell,

Id.

in the present case the

condition precedent was an express oral agreement based on
repeated face to face communications between DSI and
Cantamar.

(R.

60-67).

Cantamar's second argument against application of FMA
is that FMA is limited to situations where the condition
precedent prevents the "effectiveness" of the agreement.
(Brief of Appellee, 29-30).

Cantamar argues that DSI has

admitted the "effectiveness" of the Note, and therefore that
FMA does not apply to this case.

(Id.)

Cantamar bases its argument on certain selected facts
culled from the record, such as that DSI has acknowledged a
debt owed to Cantamar, that the debt accrues interest, that
DSI has made some interest payments, and that DSI believed
the Note would be rolled over when it came due.

(Id.,

29) .

None of the facts listed by Cantamar constitutes an
admission of the "effectiveness" of the Note for purposes of
summary judgment.

Any inference from those facts that might

-13-

be favorable to Cantamar must be disregarded.
supra,

Frlsbee,

676 P.2d at 389.
IV.
FAILURE OF THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT DOES NOT TRIGGER
DSI'S PAYMENT OBLIGATION WHERE
FAILURE WAS NOT THE FAULT OF DSI
Cantamar argues that more than a reasonable time has

elapsed since failure of the condition precedent and
therefore the obligation must be deemed immediately due and
payable in full.

(Brief of Appellee, 30-31).

There are two

defects in Cantamar's argument.
A,

Cantamar' s Argument is Not Supported by Utah Case Law.
Cantamar cited no Utah case law in support of its

argument and did not attempt to distinguish the following
Utah law relied on by DSI: "Failure of a material condition
precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform."
Harper

v.

Great

Salt

Lake Council,

Inc.,

976 P.2d 1213,

1217 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added).
Cantamar did cite case law from other jurisdictions,
but that case law can be distinguished, as shown below.

-14-

B.

The Two Cases Cited By Cantamar Are Distinguishable.
Cantamar cited two cases: Cheyenne

Reynolds

and Reynolds

and Sherman

v.

Company,

Inge!man,

Dodge,

Inc.

613 P.2d 1234 (Wyo.

138 P.2d 698 (Cal.

(Brief of Appellee, 30-31).
In Cheyenne

Dodge,

App.

v.
1980);
1943).

Both are distinguishable.

the defendant did not even allege

the existence of an oral agreement for a condition
precedent.

613 P.2d at 1235-1236.

Instead, the defendant

argued that a condition precedent should have been implied
from the wording of the written agreement.
court refused to do.

Id.,

Id.

This the

at 1236.

In the present case, in contrast, DSI has submitted
facts showing an express oral agreement for a condition
precedent.

(R. 60-67).

The second case cited by Cantamar was the Sherman

case.

In that case, repayment of a promissory note for $11,000 was
conditioned on the sale of a building owned by the obligor.
138 P.2d at 700.

The building, worth between $250,000 and

$300,000, was subject to a mortgage of only $123,000.
Seven years had passed since the signing of the note.
at 699.

Id.
Id.,

The appeals court found that enough time had gone

-15-

by and the obligor had not made reasonable efforts to
fulfill the condition or pay the note.
Under those facts, the Sherman

Id.,

at 701.

court held that where

the fulfillment of the condition is wholly within the power
of the obligor, and the obligor makes insufficient effort to
fulfill it, the court may impose a time limit and require
diligence.

138 P.2d at 700.

The present case is different from Sherman.
powerless to fulfill the condition.
that.

DSI was

Only Cantamar could do

DSI should not be punished for Cantamar's failure to

perform.
California case law applies a different rule in
situations where the failure of the condition is not the
fault of the obligor.
53 (Cal.

App.

In Haines

v.

Bechdolt,

42 Cal.Rptr.

1965), an architect entered into a written

agreement to provide drawings for a motel addition.
54.

Jd., at

Services were provided and partial payment made.

at 54-55.

The architect sued for the balance due.

Id.,

Jd.

The

motel owners claimed there was a verbal agreement that no
payment would be made unless financing was obtained, and no
financing had been obtained.

Id.,

-16-

at 54.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held as
follows: (1) the verbal agreement was a condition precedent;
(2) it was admissible because it did not vary the written
terms but rather conditioned their effectiveness; and (3)
for that reason, the written agreement never took effect.
Id.,

at 55-56.

The court further determined, however, that

the motel owners had made a partial payment, which meant
they intended to pay a reasonable amount for the architect's
services.

Based on that, the court remanded for

determination of the reasonable amount of those services.
Id.,

at 58.
The reasoning and result of Haines

the present case.

should be applied in

This case should be remanded for a

determination as to whether there was a verbal agreement
conditioning repayment of the Note on the obtaining of a $15
million loan by Cantamar.

If there was, the court below

should determine whether the evidence indicates an intention
to repay the loans obtained through Thuett on reasonable
terms, and if so, what those terms should be.

-17-

"REASONABLE RELIANCE" IS
A QUESTION OF FACT
Cantamar argues that DSI's fraud defense must fail as a
matter of law because DSI could not have reasonably relied
on Thuett's promises.

(Brief of Appellee, 33-37).

Cantamar

supports this argument in part by contending that cases
favoring DSI do so because the misrepresentation goes to the
"character" or "nature" of the document, whereas cases
favoring Cantamar feature misrepresentations about the
"contents" of the documents.

(Brief of Appellee, 34-37).

To the extent that this is true, the araument favors DSI.
not Cantamar.
The underlying question is, would reading the document
correct the factual error?
document may be fatal.

If so, then failure to read the

See,

e.g.,

P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 1945); Kubey v.
387-388 (Utah 1962); Gold

Standard,

Johnson

v.

Wood,
Inc.

Allen,

158

373 P.2d 386,

v. Getty

Oil

Co.,

915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996).
On the other hand, if the misrepresentation is not a
direct contradiction of the writing, but instead is a
promise not to enforce the written terms, or a promise to
-18-

enforce only on the happening of some condition, then
reading the document would not correct the error.

In those

situations, the contents of the document are not decisive,
especially on summary judgment.

See, e.g.,

supra,

Bank for

Melbos,
Gardner,

707 P.2d at 664; Berkeley

Union

Bank,

Cooperatives

607 P.2d 798, 800-801 (Utah 1980); W.W. and
Inc.

v.

v.
W.B.

Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984).

In the present case, the contents of the Note are not
decisive. The oral agreement in the present case does not
vary the terms of the written agreement, but instead sets up
a condition to those terms becoming effective.

For that

reason, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the
written terms themselves are so dispositive as to preclude
reasonable reliance on the oral agreement.
VI.
MUTUAL MISTAKE IS A
VIABLE DEFENSE IN THE
PRESENT CASE
Cantamar cites Warner
(Utah App.

v.

Slrstlns,

838 P.2d 666, 670

1992) for the proposition that mutual mistake

requires mistake as to the "actual contents" of a writing.
(Brief of Appellee, 37).

It is true that mistake as to the

-19-

actual contents is one of 3 alternative bases for mutual
mistake that are identified in Warner,

but it is not the

exclusive basis.
The full quote from Warner

is as follows:

The power to reform a written instrument for
mutual mistake exists when any one of the
following circumstances is satisfactorily proved:
(1) the instrument as made failed to conform to
what both parties intended; (2) the claiming party
was mistaken as to its actual content and the
other party, knowing of the mistake, kept silent;
or (3) the claiming party was mistaken as to its
actual content because of fraudulent affirmative
behavior by the other party.
Warner,

supra,

838 P.2d at 670 (emphasis added).

"Actual content" is only one of 3 alternatives.

DSI

relies primarily on one of the other alternatives, that "the
instrument as made failed to conform to what both parties
intended."

Id.

Based on the evidence presented by DSI,

there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
or not the Note as made failed to conform to what both
parties intended.

(R. 60-67).
VII.
FAILURE TO MAKE
INTEREST PAYMENTS
IS NOT DISPOSITIVE

Cantamar argues that DSI's failure to make interest
-20-

payments triggers a default under the Note.

(Brief of

Appellee, 27). This argument ignores the effect of the oral
agreement for a condition precedent to the payment
obligations set forth in the Note.
Cantamar also argues that DSI made some interest
payments and then stopped, citing lack of funds.
This evidence is not conclusive.

(Id.)

A reasonable inference

from the facts is that DSI made some interest payments
simply as an accommodation to Cantamar while waiting for
Cantamar to obtain the promised loan and fulfill the agreed
upon condition precedent.

Whether making some interest

payments would result in a waiver or estoppel is a question
of fact which should not be resolved on summary judgment.
VIII.
DSI HAS NOT WAIVED
ITS CLAIM THAT THE
INTEREST RATES ARE
UNENFORCEABLE
Cantamar argues that by agreeing to roll over the
amounts due on the prior notes into the Note, DSI waived any
claim that the interest rate in the Note is unenforceable.
(Brief of Appellee, 41-42).
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Waiver should not generally be determined on appeal
from a motion for summary judgment:
Waiver is an intensely fact dependent question,
requiring a trial court to determine whether a
party has intentionally relinquished a known
right, benefit, or advantage.
IHC Health Services,
Inc.
v.
D & K Management,
P.3d 320, 323 (Utah 2003) (emphasis added).

Inc.,

73

In a contract case, waiver requires proof of action
inconsistent with contractual rights:
Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party
to a contract intentionally acts in a manner
inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as
a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing party
or parties to the contract.
Interwest
App.

Construction

1995)

v.

Palmer,

886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah

(emphasis added).

In the present case, DSI's willingness to roll over
accrued interest from prior notes into the Note must be
viewed in the context of the ongoing agreement conditioning
repayment on obtaining a $15 million loan.

As Carl

Champagne testified in his deposition:
Q.

You agreed to those interest rates?

A. Yes, on the proviso that we were going to get
the investment to pay all this off.
Deposition of Carl Champagne, July 13, 2004, at 53; R.
(emphasis added).
-22-
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A reasonable inference from the foregoing testimony is
that if the Note, or any portion of it, is to be repaid from
DSI's income rather than from a large loan, then DSI did not
agree to the high interest rates or the rollovers, and in
such a case those rates and rollovers should be held to be
unenforceable.
IX.
DSI'S ARGUMENTS AND
EVIDENCE WERE PROPERLY
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
Cantamar contends that several of DSI's arguments, as
well as DSI's Statement of the Case, should be stricken.
(Brief of Appellee, 12, 14 n. 1 ) .
All of the facts in the Statement of the Case, and each
of the arguments Cantamar seeks to have stricken, were
presented to the court below in opposition to the first
(Id.)

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Cantamar's argument, unsupported by any legal
authority, appears to be that because DSI did not re-file
opposing memoranda and affidavits in response to the Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment, they were not properly
preserved for appeal.

(Brief of Appellee, 12, 14 n. 1 ) .
-23-

This argument disregards the facts and the law.

The

fact is that Cantamar, when filing its Renewed Motion,
stated in the motion itself that it was based upon,
alia,

Inter

the Affidavit of Carl Champagne and "the pleadings on

file in this action."

(R.

188-189).

Having formally

acknowledged and relied upon the affidavit and pleadings
already filed by DSI, Cantamar cannot reasonably fault DSI
for failing to re-file the same pleadings.
The law, too, is more expansive than Cantamar in what
should be considered by the appellate court on appeal from
summary judgment.
Peebles,

In Brookslde

Mobile

Home Park,

Ltd.

v.

48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002), the Court held that an

issue raised in connection with summary judgment did not
have to be raised again in connection with a motion for
reconsideration.

The Court explained:

[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the
issue must be presented to the trial court in such
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to
rule on that issue. ... TO]nee trial counsel has
raised an issue before the trial court, and the
trial court has considered the issue, the issue is
preserved for appeal.
Brookslde,

supra,

48 P.3d at 972 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
Summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded
for trial.
DATED this

f/y

^^ day of March, 2006.
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